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CLD-198

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 11-1665
___________
ANWAR JAVED,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
Respondent
____________________________________
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
(Agency No. A094-813-777)
Immigration Judge: Honorable Miriam K. Mills
____________________________________
Submitted on Respondent‟s Motion for Summary Action
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
May 26, 2011
Before: RENDELL, FUENTES and SMITH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: June 10, 2011 )
___________
OPINION
___________

PER CURIAM
Anwar Javed petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals‟ (“BIA”)
denial of his motion to reopen, and the Government has filed a motion for summary
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action. We will grant the Government‟s motion and deny the petition for review.
I.
Javed is a citizen of Pakistan who overstayed his visitor visa. He initially applied
for asylum and other relief on the ground that he fears mistreatment in Pakistan on
account of his Christian religion. His claims were based primarily on specific threats
against him by a group of Muslims in his hometown who claimed that he had converted
to Islam and threatened to kill him for apostasy if he did not stop practicing Christianity.
Among the evidence he submitted was the 2006 International Religious Freedom Report,
which describes numerous attacks on Christians. An Immigration Judge denied Javed‟s
claims and ordered his removal to Pakistan, and the BIA dismissed his appeal in 2008.
We denied his petition for review because he had failed to corroborate his claims. See
Javed v. Att‟y Gen., 376 F. App‟x 227 (3d Cir. 2010).
Javed then filed the motion to reopen with the BIA at issue here. He filed it more
than ninety days after the BIA‟s previous ruling, so it was untimely unless he
demonstrated that it was based on “changed country conditions” in Pakistan. 8 U.S.C. §
1229a(c)(7)(C)((ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Javed argued that conditions for
Christians had worsened in general, and he attached various newspaper articles and more
recent country reports. The BIA concluded that Javed‟s new evidence shows only
conditions similar to those at the time of his previous hearing and denied his motion as
untimely. It also declined to exercise its discretion to reopen sua sponte. Javed petitions
for review.
II.
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We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review the BIA‟s denial of
reopening for abuse of discretion and may not disturb its ruling unless it is “„arbitrary,
irrational, or contrary to law.‟” Zheng v. Att‟y Gen., 549 F.3d 260, 265 (3d Cir. 2008)
(citation omitted). In doing so, we review the BIA‟s underlying assessment of the record
for substantial evidence. Liu v. Att‟y Gen., 555 F.3d 145, 148 (3d Cir. 2009). We
perceive no abuse of discretion here.1
Javed argued before the BIA that his new evidence shows changed conditions
because it reports an increase in violence against Christians and governmental inaction
which, coupled with discriminatory laws, has created “an atmosphere of impunity” for
those attacks to continue. In rejecting that argument, the BIA compared Javed‟s new
evidence with that already of record, including the 2006 country report (which it referred
to by its designation as Exhibit 3 in the prior proceeding). The 2006 country report states
that “[a]cts of violence and harassment against Christians continued during the period
covered by this report” and goes on to report numerous acts of murder and other violence
against Christians. (2006 Report at 1, 9-10, 12, 15-17) (A.R. 173, 181-82, 184, 187-89).
It also reports the Pakistani Government‟s frequent inaction in the face of such attacks
and notes that “discriminatory legislation and the teaching of religious intolerance in
public schools creates a permissive environment for [those] attacks.” (Id. at 15) (A.R.
187).

1

Javed has not challenged the BIA‟s denial of reopening sua sponte, and we lack
jurisdiction to review such rulings in the absence of considerations that do not
apply here. See Pllumi v. Att‟y Gen., — F.3d —, No. 09-4454, 2011 WL
1278741, at *3 & n.7 (3d Cir. Apr. 6, 2011).
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Javed‟s new evidence does not compel the conclusion that conditions in Pakistan
have changed since then. Javed submitted eighty-three pages of documents in support of
his motion. The articles he submitted describe specific incidents of attacks on Christians.
Those incidents are troubling, but they are substantially similar to those described in the
2006 country report. (Mot. to Reopen, Exhs. A through J) (A.R. 63-96). The more
recent country reports are substantially in accord as well. (Id., Exhs. K through M) (A.R.
98-146).
Javed argues that the BIA gave this evidence inadequate consideration, but we
disagree. The BIA specifically discussed several of Javed‟s documents, accurately
summarized his evidence as a whole, and adequately explained why it does not show
changed country conditions. See Liu, 555 F.3d at 149 (reviewing BIA ruling containing
“the type of findings that are sufficient under Zheng”). Javed also faults the BIA‟s
reliance on a statement in a 2010 report that the Pakistani Government had taken steps to
protect the rights of religious minorities. Javed acknowledges that the report does indeed
contain “positive information,” but argues that the BIA focused on this single statement
while “ignoring” the rest of his evidence. The BIA plainly did not do so. Instead, it
relied on that statement by way of balancing a 2009 report that noted “an increase in
violence against minorities during the year” in general. (Mot. to Reopen, Ex. M, at 16)
(A.R. 132). The BIA expressly considered that general reference and, viewed in the
context of the evidence as a whole, it does not compel the conclusion that conditions in
Pakistan have changed.
Finally, Javed argues that “[t]he current state of religious freedom is abysmal and
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the Board finding to the contrary has the slender reed of a single paragraph in the record
to support it.” Javed‟s motion, however, did not call on the BIA to decide whether the
situation in Pakistan is “abysmal,” and the BIA did not do so. Instead, it concluded only
that conditions had not substantially changed since Javed‟s prior hearing. None of
Javed‟s evidence compels the contrary conclusion.
Accordingly, we will deny the petition for review.
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